12
Figure3
ImpactofRemovingDRMonRecordLabelPro ts
Vernik,Purohit,andDesai:MusicDownloadsandtheFlipSideofDRM
MarketingScience,ArticlesinAdvance,pp.1–17,©2011INFORMS
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SegmentH:Download retailer,pirated sources
Traditionalretailer
Download retailer,pirated sources
Traditionalretailer
piracy,butwealsoconsidertheimportantroleplayedbytheretailersandhowitaffectsupstreampro ts.Moreover,theextantliteraturelooksatthecompeti-tionbetweenpiratedsourcesversuslegalmusicsalesasawhole,whereaswemodelstrategicbehaviorofdownloadandtraditionalretailersastwodifferentsourcesoflegalmusic.Byanalyzingthecompetitionamongthetraditionalretailer,thedownloadretailer,andpiratedmusic,wegetabetterunderstandingofthecompetitiveforcesinthemarket.Asaresult,unliketheearlierliterature,weendogenizenotonlypiracyvolumebutalsoconsumers’choicesbetweentraditionalCDsanddigitaldownloads.
Incertaininstances,we ndthateliminatingDRMrestrictionscanleadtoanincreaseinsalesoflegaldownloads,adecreaseinsalesoftraditionalCDs,andadecreaseinpiracy.ThisisinstarkcontrasttotheviewthatremovingDRMwilluncondition-allyincreasethelevelofpiracy.ThisconclusionstemsfromtheideathatbyintroducingDRM-freemusic,
Table3
themusiclabelincreasesthedownstreamcompetitionbetweenthetraditionalformatandlegaldownloads.BecauseDRM-freemusicisastrongercompetitorfortraditionalCDs,itforcesthepricesofCDstomovedown,whichinturnlowersthelegaldownloadprice.Thiscompetitionbetweenthetraditionalanddown-loadformatslowerspricessuchthatsomeconsumersmovefromstealingmusictobuyinglegaldownloads.Thus,removingDRMcanlowerthelevelofpiracy.Furthermore,we ndthatthisresultcanoccurevenwhenconsumersdonotseeanydifferenceintheutil-itytheyderivefromDRM-freeandDRM-restrictedproducts.
Ouranalysisalsogeneratesseveraladditionalcoun-terintuitiveresults.ByremovingDRMandmakingillegalcopyingeasier,therecordlabelcanbene tfromtheintensi edcompetitionbetweenpiratedmusicandthedownloadretailer.Furthermore,thissuggeststhatDRMmayprotectthe“traditionalbusinesses,”thatis,retailersofCDs,morethantheyprotectthe
EquilibriumOutcomesUnderDirectCompetitionBetweenPiratedDigitalandLegalTraditionalFormats
Traditionalandunrestricteddownloadableversionsforsale
wUT= wUD=
2
2t eM2T 1 +eT eM 1 +t 2 + 2 3 +
T 1
Traditionalandrestricteddownloadableversionsforsale
wRT= wRD=
2
2t eM2T 1 +eT eM 1 +t 2 3 2 +
T 1
2t eM +e2T 1 +eT 1 2t+ eM
T 1
4t eM+wRD +e2T 1
T 1 3t+2wRDRTM 1+
2eMt +e2T 1 +eT 1 2t+eM
T 1
4t eMUD +e2T 1 +eT 1 3t+2wUDUTM
T 1 3+
2e2T 1 +2t eM 1+ +2t+wUD 1 +2wUT
T t 3 1 +4 + 1 wUD 1 +2 wUTM
pRD=
T 1 3+
pUD=
pRT=
2e2T 1 +2t eM 1+ +2t+ wRD+ 1 +2wRT
T 1 wRD 1 +2 wRTM +t 3 4 1+ + 2
T 1 3+
pUT=
T 1 3+
DRT=
2e2T 1 +2t 2t+ 1 +eM 1+
1 +2eM +t 3 4 1 + 2
T 1 3+
2t +eT 1 4t eM +e2T 1 T 1 3t 1+ +eM
TT DUT=
2e2T 1 +2t eM 1+ +2t
T 2eM 1 t 4 + 3 4 + 2
T 1 3+
DRD=
DUD=
2t +eT 1 4eMt +e2T 1 +eT 1 3t+eM
TT
RL=wRTDRT+wRDDRD
UL=wUTDUT+wUDDUD
Note.Where = 1 and = 1 1 .