The economist 09-4-24(12)

经济学人

China was not about to work with it on a new world order.

中国对欧盟的兴趣于2003年达到顶峰，当时该组织似乎已即将通过统一宪法，选出共同的外长和专任的总统。但欧中蜜月于2006年结束，当时中国未能赢得欧盟支持取消自1989年***以来实行的武器禁运。在政策研讨会和闭门会议上，由国家资助的中国分析员们开始流露出优越感来。在2008年于斯德哥尔摩举办的一个会议上，美国被形容成一个强壮的成年人，中国是生机勃勃的年轻人，而欧洲则是已步入晚年的“富裕而衰弱的老头”。在最近于英国举办的一次维尔敦会议上，一名中国学者称欧盟为一股微弱的势力，对于挑战美国霸权毫无准备：中国在构建世界新秩序时不会与之为伍。

Unity meets disunity

“合”与“分”

If you wanted to design a competitor to show up European weaknesses most painfully, you would come up with something a lot like China. It is a

centralised, unitary state, which is patient and relentless in the pursuit of national goals that often matter more to the Chinese than anyone else. European governments do not even agree on what they want from China. They are fuzzily committed to EU “values”, but will readily trample on those in a scramble to secure jobs and cheap goods for their voters. They do not share the same vision of trade policy, or how best to press China on climate change. Worse, the biggest countries, especially France, Germany and Britain, compete to be China’s favourite European partner. This causes damage. It was mad that the British and Germans did not rush to back Mr Sarkozy when he was bullied over the Dalai Lama. They could easily have insisted that EU leaders meet whomsoever they want.

如果你想为欧洲设计一个能最毫不留情地显示欧洲的衰弱的对手的话，那么它的样子将最接近于中国。中国是一个集权的、统一的国家，它耐心地、毫无保留地追求那些通常仅与中国最有关的国家目标。而欧洲则甚至连他们希望从中国那里获得什么都不能达成一致。他们模糊地认同所谓的“欧洲价值观”，但一旦在为他们的选民们争夺安全的工作或廉价的商品时，就马上转而践踏这些“价值观”。他们对在贸易政策或气候变化问题上如何去推动中国等方面都没有一致的愿景。更是糟糕的是，那些最大的欧洲国家，特别是法国、德国和英国，都在相互竞争成为中国最满意的欧洲伙伴。