The economist 09-4-24(5)

经济学人

The country’s three “megabanks”—Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG), Mizuho and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (SMFG)—are particularly

vulnerable. Their shareholdings as a percentage of tier-one capital range from just below 50% to above 60% (see chart). The trio are expected to post losses this year.

日本三大“超级银行”——三菱日联金融集团（Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group）、瑞穗金融集团（Mizuho Financial Group）和三井住友金融集团（Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group）——尤为岌岌可危。他们所持股权占一级资本的百分比由50%以下变动至60%以上（见表）。预计三大行今年将亏损。

But in Japan, even the titans find it hard to break with tradition, especially one that dates back to the Meiji era in the late 1800s when Japan began to industrialise. Capital was scarce and banks felt they had a role to support national industry; taking a stake in a borrower showed that their fates were united. Moreover, most banks were linked to companies within corporate

families, called zaibatsu. That smoothed trade within and outside the groups.

但在日本，即使是伟人也难于打破传统，尤其是在19世纪末日本开始工业化的明治时代。资本匮乏，且银行认为它们有责任支撑本国的工业；参股借贷企业表示他们一损俱损，一荣俱荣。此外，大多数银行都与家族集团联系在一起，称之为财阀。这样做使集团内外的交易顺利进行。

After the second world war, huge conglomerates were forbidden and replaced by the keiretsu, a network of individual companies working together. Cross-shareholdings remained routine.

二战后，大型企业集团被禁，转而由企业联盟替代，这是一个私营公司合作网。交叉持股依然是惯例。

For most of the postwar period, the arrangement was highly lucrative. As share prices soared, balance-sheets swelled. This in turn pushed share prices higher. But after the bubble burst in 1990, it took a decade for regulators to begin forcing banks to reduce their shareholdings. In 2002 the government capped